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The main aim of this research was to explore the organizational and inter-organizational factors affecting aircraft
maintenance safety. Specifically it is intended: (a) to probe the categories of organizational factors which effect
maintenance safety through the study of an aircraft maintenance organization; and (b) to explore the interface between
pilots and maintenance technicians, which is referred to as the information interface due to the exchange of the
information between both parties for the safety of flight. The study consisted of 17 interviewees from one aircraft
maintenance organization in China, who participated in structured one-on-one interviews. The data were coded using
content analysis techniques which could convert the qualitative interview data into quantitative data. Four categories
of factors were revealed, including individual and environment, factors relating to the technical systems, non-technical
systems, information interface. Results of this research also show that compared to the pilots, the maintenance
personnel were less strict with the departure standards for the aircraft (e.g. minimum equipment), which may lead to
the conflict between pilots and maintenance personnel.
Introduction
Aircraft maintenance is a critical component of the
overall system for ensuring safety in aviation
(McDonald, Corrigan, Daly & Cromie, 2000).
Mistakes by maintenance technicians contribute to
quite a few percent of aviation accidents (O’hare,
Wiggins, Batt & Morrison, 1994; cited in McDonald,
Corrigan, Daly & Cromie, 2000). And thhe number of
`maintenance concern' accidents had increased recent
years (cited in McDonald, Corrigan, Daly & Cromie,
2000; cited in ICAO, 2003). In China, there is no
specific statistic data describing the maintenance
problems, but it still could be predicted that the
number of aviation events will probably increase due
to the rapid growth in civil aviation recent years. So
the systematic theoretical exploration on maintenance
safety is necessary and important.
The study on organizational factors
The organizational safety and accident causation
model developed by James Reason can be considered
a milestone of safety study in behavioral sciences
(Reason, 1990). It illustrates how organizational and
other human factors contribute to the breakdown of
human performance in a system and thus adversely
affect safety, which broke through the limit of human
factors study taken individuals as source of problems.
After Reason, many experts began to explore the
organizational factors with the term organizational
errors. Summarized them, the organizational errors
mentioned were included incomplete training,
inadequate communication between pilots and
controllers (Amalbeti, 1993); unhealthy safety
culture(Wilpert, 1993); Management or
organizational errors, incompatible management goal,
failure in communication (Baram, 1993); decision
making, communication, organizational structure,
human-computer interaction, culture (Grabowski &
Robert, 1998) ; lack of holistic thinking, lack of
communication and supervision because of the
application  of  FMS  also  were  taken  as  the
organizational factors (Wagenarr, 1993; Qvale, 1993;
Helmreich, 1997). Most of the documents above were
reviews, theoretical articles or results of case study.
Recently years, many researchers use the words
“organizational factors” to study the factors affecting
the safety. Most of them use the questionnaire
methods, and research fields include civil aviation,
petroleum industry et al (Hofman, 1994, Rundmo,
1998, Probst, 2004). And the results included: the
commitment and involvement of supervisor and
management to the safety, social support, the attitude
of management and employees on the human factors,
organizational structure, the role of regulation in the
standard and training plan, change of technology and
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organization, organizational culture, training and
recruitment, safety climate, safety management
system, risk management, urgent measures et al.
Actually, different researchers use different term to
express the same topic, organizational factors and
organizational errors to study the effect of
organizations  on  the  safety  of  systems.  To  unify  the
term, our research will use organizational factors.
Another popular approach to study organizational
factors is event/ incident/ accident analysis (Fahlbruch
& Wilpert, 1997). This kind of hindsight method is
easy to meet information collection difficulties and
being blocked by blame, organizational politics and
cover-up (Pidgeon & O'Leary, 2000 ). So what we
concern is if there is a research method which could go
around the disadvantage of questionnaires, during
which the respondents could only answer the
questions passively (not so many persons will answer
the open-ended questions), and the difficulties of
accidents investigation. One-on-one interview and
content analysis technique which is a method to
change the qualitative data into quantitative data was
used in our study. This paper was the preliminary
study results of our interview which focusing on the
organizational factors affecting maintenance safety.
Method
Sample
A total of 17 maintenance technicians randomly
selected from one maintenance company attended the
interview, which including 13 advanced technicians
(T2), 1 technician (T1), and 3 trainee-technicians (T0).
Interview questions
The research was designed semi-structure interviews.
Questions included the individual and organizational
demographic information used as warming up
question; Factors promoting the safety of the
organization and the whole flight system, especial the
organizational factors; factors hindering safety;
describing e a impressive successful or failed events
during interviewee’s work, and the last question was
asked the technician’s attitude to the attitude to the
flight standards of differences.
Interview Procedure
After being admitted from the interviewee, the whole
interview process was recorded with cassette recorder.
And the sound file was converted to the transcript for
the further analysis.
Coding procedure
The main procedures to analysis the interview data
was as follows:
Coders selection. Three graduate students major in
industry and organizational psychology were invited
to join the coding work.
Coders training. All the three students had the coding
work experiences and mastered the coding skills.
They visited the fields and attended some of the
interviews, which could help them know more of the
aviation knowledge and understand the interview
transcripts completely.
Establishing recoding book. At first, a researcher
drafted a coding book according to the literatures and
5 randomly selected interview transcripts. The three
coders reviewed it respectively and extracted relevant
variables. Based on the four persons’ discussions, they
came  up  to  the  common  opinions  about  the  named
variables, establishing the coding book.  There were
total  36  variables  in  the  coding  book  which  were
showed in table 1.
Coding. Coders would code the data in accordance
with two criteria, one is mentioned or not by the
maintenance personnel. If the variable was mentioned,
coded as 1, otherwise it is 0. The second criterion was
the attitude or opinion of the maintenance personnel.
The coders will assign values (negative as 1, neutral as
2 and positive as 3. 0) to different variables according
to interviewees’ expression.
The coders coded the transcripts respectively, and then
discussed their code together, the process of which
followed the majority principle, which meant at least
two of the coders coded the same value to a particular
transcript’ particular variable, it would be the final
value of the variable for this transcript except that the
third coder could prove that his code was right.
Before the coding, the coders practiced one transcript,
and the inter-rater reliability was calculated,
if it’s above .70, the code could be started. The coders




The formula being used to calculate the inter-rater
reliability raised by Winter(1992) is R =2 ( nA B )/( nA
+ nB), in  which,  A  and  B  refers  to  either  two  of  the
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coders, and nA, nB are the numbers coded as mentioned
by coder A and coder B respectively. In order to get
the three coders’ inter-rater reliability, either two of
the coders’ inter-rater reliability were calculated
respectively, and then the function fisher and fisherinv
were used to calculate the three coders’ reliability. The
value of inter-rater reliability is .77 in this study,
which is acceptable.
Descriptive results. Table 1 showed the descriptive
results about the variables mentioned or not by the
interviewees. Table 2 demonstrated the interviewees’
evaluation score.
Cluster analysis. Due  to  the  limited  numbers  of
interviewees, experts’ subjective cluster analysis was
used to replace the statistic cluster analysis. Similar to the
coding process, the coders classified the 36 variables into
different respectively according to their understanding to
organizational factors respectively, then discussed and
integrate their categories together. Actually, due to the
former experience, it’s easy for the coders to reach
agreement on the number of categories, as well as the
variables’ distribution in different category.
According to the experts’ opinion, the factors affecting
the quality of maintenance and flight safety were
classified into 4 factors. The first category was the
factors relating to individual and environment, including
physical environment, individual physical status,
emotion, attitude to work, events during life, technical
skill;  the second category referred to the factors relating
to the technical systems, including  technical supervision
system, quality supervision system, the system of  T2 ‘
signature, technical appraisal to employee, technical
training, clarity of responsibility et al;  the third category
was relating to the non-technical factors, including
meeting system, system of human resource recruitment,
salary and welfare, humanistic management, the
variables relating to culture, such as team building, bad
model leaders et al.; the fourth category was the factors
relating to the information interface, including
coordination between maintenance and flight crew,
coordination between departments, coordination
between the members within department,
communication between the supervisor and subordinate,
shift system et al, of which the second to the fourth
categories are the organizational factors concerned by
this research.
Inter-organizational factors affecting safety. The
interviewees from pilots and maintenance staffs
mentioned MEL (minimum equipment list) and this
attitude variable is coded into two levels: At MEL and
above MEL. The results are shown in table 3. The data
of pilots were from the interviews with pilots.








Pilots 16 2 18
Maint. Person. 1 6 7
Total 17 8 25
12.89 .001
The 2 analysis showed that the maintenance
personnel’s attitude to MEL was significant different
from the pilots’ which may lead to the conflict
between them and affect the safety.
Table 1.  Variables Mentioned by technician(n=17)
Variables frequency %
Working attitude 17 100
Technical system and rule 17 100
Signature regulation 17 100
Salary and welfare regulation 17 100
Administrative regulation 14 82.4






the regulation of  T2 ‘
signature and supervision
12 70.6
Penalty regulation 12 70.6
Implementation of regulation 12 70.6
Physical  status 11 64.7
Emotion 11 64.7
Lack of human resource 11 64.7
Time pressure 10 58.8
Relationship with other jobs
within department
10 58.8
Non-technical training 10 58.8
Individual technical skill 9 52.9
Clarity of responsibility 9 52.9




Bad model leaders 7 41.2
Team building 7 41.2
Humanistic management 7 41.2
Effect of events in life 6 35.3













regulation and time pressure
6 35.3
Physical environment 5 29.4
Participation management 5 29.4
Experience feedback 5 29.4
Discussion
Variables interviewees concerned
As the results of table 1 shown, the factors maintenance
personnel concerned were not only directly related to
the safety, such as technique training, but also some
factors relevant to the their personal interests, such as
penalty system, Salary and welfare system et al., which
may not have direct effects on safety, they do have
some unavoidable effects on employees’ psychological
states and moods.
Table 2.  Interviewee’s evaluation scores (n=17)
Variable Mean S.D.
Administrative regulation 2.53 0.78





the  regulation  of   T2  ‘
signature and supervision
1.73 0.79
Penalty regulation 2.17 0.98
Tools and equipment 1.13 0.35
Time pressure 1.11 0.33













Technical training 1.50 0.91
Non-technical training 1.43 0.79








Team building 3.00 0.00
Clarity of responsibility 2.11 0.78
Participant management 1.80 1.10
Humanistic management 1.00 0.00
Comparison of technique systems, rules and
administration rules
During the interviews with maintenance staffs, all the
interviewees mentioned the technique systems and
rules and gave high evaluation scores. Here, the
technique systems and rules refer to the technical
operation manuals. The main body of this kind of
manuals came from the aircraft manufactures.  The
other variables related to the technique guard have
lower evaluation scores, such as T2 signed and
supervision system. The basic meaning of that system
was as follows: the technicians having professional
titles as T2 could assign their partial work to T1 and
T0, and have the supervising responsibility to their
work. After T1 and T0’s work, T2 should sign
working card to indicating they would take
responsibility for it.
“I did stamp the seal, but I didn’t do that work. I think
I am bad luck” (----one T2 said)
In practice, it is indeed very hard to realize this
regulation. First, 64.7% interviewees mentioned that
the company didn’t have sufficient human resources.
They did not satisfy with the existed training system,
although the technique training is the foundation of
technique exams, professional promotions. Due to the
limited human resources, the training chances
decrease and so do the promotion’s probability. As a
result, there have fewer T2 technicians. So the
non-technical factors could affect the technical factors
to some extent.
Regulation and its implementation
How well that the regulations implemented was
another factor maintenance personnel concerned.
70.6%  of  the  interviewees  mentioned  it  and  the
evaluation  score  to  it  was  lower  than  neutral.  A
relevant variable is bad model leaders. The leaders’
behavior would influence their subordinates’
behaviors because leaders play the “model” roles.
There were 41.2% maintenance staffs mentioned their
leader’s influences. Eastern people “holistic thinking”
view proposed by Ji, Peng and Nisbett (2000) is
supported here.
“If the leader obeys the rules, 80-90% of his
subordinates will obey the rules also. If the leader
doesn’t, his subordinates will not do it also.” (a
maintenance personnel)
76.5% maintenance staff mentioned about the
existence of the behaviors against the rules. This
brought about a question how to guarantee the
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regulation’s implementation. There were 58.8%
interviewees talking about the time pressure. In order
to guarantee the plane to take off one time, they must
finish the corresponding maintenance work before the
deadline. This pressure or objective requirement
provides the chances of breaking the rules. In addition,
it was worth thinking about whether the regulation
itself is reasonable or not. For example, “Sign working
card” has only 1.87 points of evaluation. This rule was
planned to prevent “mistake, forget, miss” etc human
errors of technicians. But one maintenance person
said:
“If I sign the working card at every step, I couldn’t
complete three working cards a day.” “My work is
continuous, but it would be interrupted by singing
work cards.” “I was checking a filter. My hands were
really dirty. How could I sign the working card at that
time?”
At the same time, in order to guarantee the taking off
time of the plane, rushing through their jobs will
happen. Furthermore, the clients (airlines) evaluate
maintenance companies based on the on-time-rate of
the planes. For the sake of this reason, maintenance
companies might rush through their work.
Inter-organizational factors
The airlines use plane-take-off-on-time rate to assess
maintenance. The maintenance staff has a trade-off
between on-time and safety. But the flight should
place safety at the first place. On the other hand, the
maintenance staff’s working attitude and their
responsibilities should be considered as well. This
conflict may lead to different attitude to the capability
of the equipment. From the perspective of the airlines,
how to find a more reasonable and more
comprehensive evaluation index instead of
plane-take-off-on-time rate should be further
explored. For the maintenance companies, how to
ensure the maintenance staff’s working attitude and
responsibilities besides their professional skills should
be further considered.
Conclusions, limitations and implications
Basic conclusion
(1) According to the experts’ clusters, three categories
of organizational errors in the domain of the civil air
system are obtained. They are technique-controlled
factors, non-technique factors and information
interface.
(2) The maintenance personnel and pilots have
different standards towards MFL. The pilots have
strict MFL than the maintenance staffs.
Limitation and implication
(1) The data used in this study came from
semi-constructed interviews. Due to limited time and
energies, the number of interviewees is relatively
small.
(2) The clustered analysis did not provide the expected
results. The experts’ clusters have been influenced by
experts’ previous studies, basically, following the
previous research’s logic.
(3) The study just had a very rough exploration to the
organizational factors affecting safety. The culture
issues which were an important part of organizational
factors have been mentioned but need further study
too.
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